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The reaction of a murder victim's family to the homicide is
inadmissible at the sentencing phase of the trial, according to the
recent Supreme Court ruling in Booth v. Maryland.' The five-mem-
ber majority held that testimony by members of a victim's family
violates the eighth amendment by improperly shifting the focus
away from the blameworthiness of the defendant.2 However, four
dissenting justices maintained that such testimony should be admis-
sible because the harm incurred by a victim's family is an acceptable
factor in determining society's reaction to the crime.3
The apparent amenability of four justices to allow a sentencing
trial to shift at least partially away from a traditional evaluation of
the blameworthiness of the defendant and toward the harm incurred
by others raises questions concerning the purposes of punishment
for major offenses. These questions include broad philosophical is-
sues that the Supreme Court did not discuss. The most important
of these issues is whether the commonly mentioned "retributive"
rationale for criminal punishment can be used to justify the dissent-
ers' conclusion that the court should admit testimony from the vic-
tim's family into evidence, or whether a different, and perhaps more
subtle, rationale for punishment better justifies the admission of
such testimony.
This Article focuses on how evidence of the effect of crime on
* Judicial law clerk for the Hon. George H. Revercomb, United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1988; B.A.,
University of Virginia, 1982.
1 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
2 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
3 Justices White, Scalia, and O'Connor, and ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented.
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its victims and their families can support or debunk rationales for
criminal punishment. Using a utilitarian, economic, and individual-
oriented approach, the Article concludes that social "retribution"-
the socially oriented notion of "just deserts"-cannot stand as a ra-
tionale for criminal punishment. Instead, the Article suggests ac-
knowledging an individual-oriented "vengeance" rationale for
criminal punishment, based on the observed visceral satisfaction felt
by individuals in society as the result of seeing a criminal punished
for his crime.
The distinction between social retribution and individual ven-
geance is that the former is supposedly a socially created notion that
the criminal "deserves" punishment, whereas the latter is an indi-
vidual-oriented observation that individuals in society gain individual
satisfaction from knowing that a criminal is being punished. Aggre-
gated individual vengeance can fit easily into utilitarian and eco-
nomic models of human and governmental behavior. Social
retribution, on the other hand, must rest on some uneasy notion of
natural law that commands punishment, even if the punishment
does not necessarily further any individual's utility.
Moreover, the distinction between social retribution and indi-
vidual vengeance is not merely a philosophical matter of labeling a
rationale for punishment. If we accept individual vengeance and
not social retribution as a reason to punish, we may more readily
accept evidence of the effects of a crime on a victim or the victim's
family, such as that offered in Booth. Finally, the switch does not
merely expand evidence in a criminal case; rather, the switch pro-
vides social libertarians with a powerful weapon with which to argue
the unjustifiability of criminalizing acts such as homosexual activity
solely on moral grounds.
II. BOOTH v. MARYLAND AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT
Evidence of the effect of a felony on the victim or the victim's
family became admissible in Maryland through a law that required
the filing of a victim impact statement (VIS) by the State Division of
Parole and Probation.4 The VIS, which the prosecutor could read
to the jury, had to include information such as "any change in the
victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the
offense," and "any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result
of the offense."
'5
The Booth case itself involved a gruesome double-murder fol-
4 MD. CODE ANN. § 4-609(c) (1986).
5 Id. § 4-609(c)(3)(ii), (iv).
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lowing an attempt to rob the victims' home in Baltimore.6 The vic-
tims' bodies were discovered two days later by their son. 7 A jury
found the defendant John Booth guilty of first-degree murder.8 At
the sentencing phase, the "[d]efense counsel moved to suppress the
VIS on the ground that the information [it contained] was both ir-
relevant and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a
capital case violated the Eighth Amendment." 9 After the trial court
denied the motion, the prosecutor read the VIS to the jury, and the
jury sentenced Booth to death.10 The Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction and the sentence."1
The VIS in the Booth case included very emotional statements
by the victims' son, daughter, and granddaughter. 12 The family
members described the emotional trauma and pain that they exper-
ienced as a result of the murders, as well as the personal qualities of
the victims.' 3 In addition, the VIS included the relatives' impres-
sions of the crime itself and even their assessments of the defend-
ant.14 The VIS concluded with the comment that "[i]t is doubtful
that [the relatives] will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy
and not be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in which
their loved ones were murdered and taken from them."' 15
The Supreme Court majority opinion, written by Justice Powell,
held the VIS inadmisssible because of the need in a capital sentenc-
ing hearing to focus on the circumstances of the crime, such as the
level of brutality, and on the nature and blameworthiness of the de-
fendant.16 Justice Powell stated that, "[t]he focus of a VIS, however,
is not on the defendant, but on the character and reputation of the
victim and the effect on his family."' 7 Justice Powell added that
6 The victims, Irwin Bronstein, age 78, and his wife Rose, age 75, were each "bound
and gagged, and then stabbed repeatedly in the chest with a kitchen knife" by defendant
John Booth and Willie Reid, who were neighbors of the Bronsteins, and who apparently
entered the home in an attempt to steal money. 107 S. Ct. at 2530.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2532.
10 Id.
I1 Id. at 2530 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986)).
12 Id. at 2536-39 (complete VIS included in appendix to decision).
13 Id. at 2537-38. The son said that he suffered depression and lack of sleep; the
daughter said that she suffered depression and could no longer look at kitchen knives
without being reminded of the murders. The granddaughter described how the
murders had forced her to seek counseling and had ruined her sister's wedding. Id.
14 Id. at 2538 (daughter stating that "the people who did [the murder] could [n]ever
be rehabilitated").
15 Id. at 2539.
16 Id. at 2532 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
17 Id.
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"[t]hese factors may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of
a particular defendant."' 8
Admitting statements from the VIS, Justice Powell continued,
"could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors
about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to
the decision to kill. This evidence thus could divert the jury's atten-
tion away from the defendant's background and record, and the cir-
cumstances of the crime."' 9
The majority clearly adhered to the viewpoint that blameworthi-
ness operates as the sole criteria by which the level of punishment
should be determined. This blameworthiness, debated at length in
most capital murder cases, focuses on the defendant. A jury decid-
ing whether to impose the death penalty, for example, may consider
"'aggravating circumstances" of the defendant's crime, such as the
gruesomeness of the murder or whether it was committed along
with another felony.20 Similarly, the jury must also consider "miti-
gating factors" concerning either the crime or the defendant as an
individual. 21 In all cases, the focus must remain on the defendant,
as presented through evidence of his crime and worth as an individ-
ual. As explained in Booth, a majority of the Court would not allow
factors unrelated to the inherent blameworthiness of the individ-
ual-factors such as the level of sorrow, anger, or resentment
caused by the murder-to enter the jury's calculus. 22
Following this traditional analysis, the Booth majority found a
number of fatal flaws in allowing evidence of the murder's impact on
the victim's family to affect the level of punishment. The defendant
cannot control, and in most cases does not even know, the extent to
which the murder will affect the family members23 or whether the
family members are articulate or persuasive in expressing their
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-204 (1976)(plurality opinion)(affirming
imposition of death penalty when jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant's crime involved special "aggravating circumstance," such as whether it was
"particularly heinous" or was committed in the course of another capital felony).
21 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 300-03 (1976)(plurality opin-
ion)(striking down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty for murder, ruling that
defendant must be given opportunity to present to jury evidence "of the character and
record of the individal offender").
22 Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2536.
23 Id. at 2534. In some cases, the Court noted, the victim will not even leave behind a




grief, as were the family members in Booth.24
Furthermore, the Court explained that it could find no justifica-
tion for permitting the character of the victim to affect the level of
punishment. 25 Introducing evidence of the character of the victim,
the Court continued, would undoubtedly lead to a "mini-trial" of
the victim, which would pose significant difficulties for the defense
and would "distract the sentencing jury from its constitutionally re-
quired task-determining whether the death penalty is appropriate
in light of the background and record of the accused and the partic-
ular circumstances of the crime."
26
Finally, the Court addressed the introduction of family mem-
bers' personal opinions and characterizations of the crime and the
defendant. The majority stated that such evidence serves only to
"inflame the jury," adding that the decision to impose the death
penalty must be " 'based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.' "27
In short, the majority in Booth determined that a death penalty
hearing must not become analogous to a tort suit, in which the
amount of liability often depends on the characteristics of the victim
and the victim's family.28 There is to be no rule that the murderer
"takes his victim as he finds him."' 29 In other words; an offender
must not be penalized more or less based on the family's love for
the victim or the victim's support of the family. Most of the aspects
of the Maryland VIS criticized by the majority-whether the victim
was loved, whether the family members could express their grief
persuasively, and the "mini-trial" concerning the vihtim-are in fact
regular features of wrongful death trials. 30 The majority in Booth
rejected the tort focus on both offender and victim in favor of an
evaluation based solely on the blameworthiness of the defendant. If
24 Id. ("Certainly the degree to which a family is willing and able to express its grief is
irrelevant to the decision whether a defendant.., should live or die.").
25 Id. The Court maintained that there was no "principled way to distinguish cases in
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many [cases] in which it was not.'" Id.
(quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)). What the Court apparently
meant by this statement is that there is no way to distinguish the cases on grounds that it
deems constitutional.
26 Id. at 2535.
27 Id. at 2536 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
28 See G. DOUTHWArrE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § § 6-4, 6-
10, 6-17, 6-19, 6-20 (2d ed. 1988)(damages. are calculated to compensate for actual inju-
ries suffered by plaintiffs).
29 See id. at §§ 6-10, 6-15, 6-17, 7-1 (damage calculations are based on individualized
factors).
30 See id. at §§ 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5 (damage calculations in wrongful death cases
involve inquiry into victim's entire life).
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one accepts this criterion as the proper conception of criminal jus-
tice, then there exists little doubt that Booth was rightly decided on
all counts.
Yet four Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
O'Connor and Scalia, dissented from the Court's opinion, arguing
that the testimony of a murder victim's family is constitutionally ad-
missible. Although the two separate dissenting opinions by Justice
White and Justice Scalia are both short and conclusory, Justice
Scalia raised the key issue addressed in this Article.
Justice White maintained in his dissenting opinion that the
affront to humanity of a brutal murder such as petitioner committed is
not limited to its impact on the victim or victims; a victim's community
is also injured, and in particular the victim's family suffers shock and
grief of a kind difficult even to imagine for those who have not shared
a similar loss.
3 1
While this is true, the point of the majority opinion was that blame-
worthiness of the defendant, not factors outside the control of the
defendant, is the only valid criterion. 32 Justice White contested the
majority's principal holding by observing that the harm to the vic-
tim's family is relevant in non-capital cases. 33 Justice White noted
that since most jurors will look "less favorably" on the defendant
who has caused suffering, there is "nothing aberrant" in allowing
this "inclination" to be translated into a tougher penalty.34
Justice Scalia took a more focused and provocative approach in
his dissenting opinion, criticizing the notion of blameworthiness as
the sole determinant of punishment in death penalty cases. He first
noted that the death penalty cannot be imposed for a murder at-
tempt that does not succeed, even though whether the victim lives
or dies may be wholly unrelated to "blameworthiness. ' 3 5 This point
makes clear that, at least in some instances, one who attempts mur-
der may be judged by factors totally out of his control.
31 Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2539 (White, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 2532-36.
33 Id. at 2539-40 (White, J., dissenting) (reckless homicide merits geater punishment
than reckless driving, although the only difference may be that in first situation a pedes-
trian happens to be in the path of the car).
34 Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also based much of his argument on def-
erence to the moral decision of the state of Maryland to include the VIS in the sentenc-
ing calculus of juries. Yet certainly the entire thrust of Supreme Court opinions
regarding the death penalty since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down
imposition of death penalty when broad discretion is granted to jury), as well as the
moral command of the eighth amendment itself-no "cruel and unusual punishment"-
requires the Supreme Court to reevaluate the "moral" decisions of state legislatures
with regard to capital punishment.
35 Id. at 2541-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia also mentioned the recent "outpouring of popular
concern for what has come to be known as 'victims' rights,'" which
he defined as the consideration of factors such as "the amount of
harm [the defendant] has caused to innocent members of society."
' 36
Apparently accepting this as a basis for determining the level of
criminal punishment, Justice Scalia struck at the center of the blame-
worthiness fortress: "the principle upon which the Court's opinion
rests-that the imposition of capital punishment is to be determined
solely on the basis of moral guilt-does not exist, neither in the text
of the Constitution, nor in the historic practices of our society, nor
even in the opinions of this Court."
37
This extraordinary passage exposes a fundamental disagree-
ment with the premise adopted by the majority of the Court. How-
ever, while the majority explicates and backs its viewpoint with the
entire thrust of Supreme Court opinions of the past twenty years,
Justice Scalia's conception raises crucial questions that he fails to
answer. It is one thing to advocate the consideration of harm to
victims' families, and another to fix that visceral feeling into a coher-
ent scheme of criminal punishment.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEw APPROACH TO THE RATIONALE FOR
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
The validity of the comments of the majority and those of Jus-
tice Scalia depends on the purposes of criminal punishment for seri-
ous crimes. If, as the Booth majority intimates, blameworthiness and
moral guilt are the primary focuses of punishment, then the major-
ity's dislike of considering the level of "harm" caused (at least in
murder cases) holds considerable intellectual strength. If, however,
the justification for pinning punishment to retribution is intellectu-
ally shaky, then the minority's suggestion of considering harm to
victims' families must be considered more closely.
This section approaches the purposes of punishment from a
classically liberal, utilitarian angle. This discussion does not require
a debate of any of the issues of Jeremy Bentham's "pleasure and
pain" analysis 38 or recent economic analyses of the alleged rational
36 Id. at 2542.
37 Id.
38 See J. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19-41 (1830). Bentham stated
that man's purpose is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, and that government
should facilitate this quest. From this he concluded that punishment of those on whom




behavior of criminals.3 9 Instead, all one needs to accept is a version
of the Pareto optimality hypothesis, 40 which states that a change that
makes at least one person worse off without making any other per-
son better off is an undesirable-or "Pareto inferior"-change.
Bentham, who believed that criminal punishment was justified
by a deterrence rationale, did not directly attack the rationale of ret-
ribution for criminal punishment.4 1 Indeed, few have attacked the
essential core of the retributive function because of the disconcert-
ing gap that would result if retribution were discarded as a rationale
for punishment. 42 Nearly everyone, including the most calculating
utilitarian, doubtless accepts some notion of blameworthiness and
moral guilt. Yet, the visceral feelings of disgust, anger, and passion
that dwell inside persons confronted with a violent criminal should
not be characterized as a demand for social retribution, as the term is
usually defined. Rather, this feeling is better characterized, and
better employed as a rationale for punishment, as an individual de-
sire for vengeance-a word used despite its usual pejorative
connotations.
Although social retribution and individual vengeance may ap-
pear synonymous, there is a significant distinction. Social retribu-
tion, as defined here, means that as a society, we must punish a
criminal because he deserves punishment. Individual vengeance, as
defined here, is an individual's desire to punish a criminal because
the individual gains satisfaction from seeing or knowing that the
person receives punishment. The definition may at first strike some
as distasteful, but this analysis accurately reflects human feeling and
appropriately fits within the framework of a utilitarian and just anal-
ysis of criminal punishment.
An explanation of the traditional rationales for criminal punish-
ment43 must precede a discussion of the proposed shift from social
retribution to individual vengeance. The four broad traditional jus-
tifications for criminal punishment include: 1) deterrence, 2) retri-
bution, 3) rehabilitation, and 4) incapacitation. 44 Deterrence, which
refers to the disincentive effect on others of punishing a criminal, is
occasionally challenged as a rationale, but remains the most popular
39 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205-07 (3d ed. 1986).
40 See, e.g., Coleman, Efficiency and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 226-31 (1980).
41 J. BENTHAM, supra note 38.
42 A. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT (1929)(criticizing retributive rationale).
43 In an economic analysis, it would be a Pareto inferior move to punish the offender,
unless there is a justification for inflicting pain on him.
44 See, e.g., P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-
28 (2d ed. 1982).
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justification among utilitarians and economists. 45 Rehabilitation,
and its cousin, specific deterrence, refer to the effect of criminal
punishment on a particular criminal's desire to break the law
again.4 6 Incapacitation, the simplest and least controversial justifica-
tion, is simply based on the fact that, behind bars, a criminal has
little opportunity to commit additional crimes, except those on
other criminals.
4 7
The most unfocused of the justifications is social retribution,
which becomes all the more elusive by meaning different things to
different people. The stock of commonly used expressions is testa-
ment to its nature: "eye for an eye," "just deserts," "moral punish-
ment," "debt to society," "pay for the crime."'48 For present
purposes, social retribution in its pure form connotes the notion
that, by committing a crime, an offender automatically triggers a
punishment. Whether the necessity for this punishment stems from
God, morality, or society, the key element of pure social retribution
is that the justification transcends individuals and depends on some
larger source.4 9 So defined, social retribution is not as broad as it
might seem at first blush. First, it is related to but separate from the
notion of proportionality, which states that different crimes must
command different punishments because they are less blameworthy,
and, thus, the criminal "deserves" less punishment. 50 Yet, propor-
tionality can be viewed as simply a limitation on the rationales of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. To see this, assume
that these three rationales were the only ones for criminal punish-
ment. All sentences would then be extreme, even for minor of-
fenses such as jaywalking-a life sentence would deter nearly all
jaywalking, incapacitate the jaywalker for the longest time, and en-
45 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 38; R. POSNER, supra note 39; Andenaes, The Gen-
eral Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 956-57 (1966).
46 See, e.g., P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 44, at 22-24.
47 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAw 24 (2d ed. 1988); P. Low,J.JEFFRIES &
R. BONNIE, supra note 44, at 22-24.
48 See, e.g., W. LAFAvE, supra note 47, at 24.
49 See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). In this famous case,
the Queen's Bench gave the death penalty to two shipwrecked men who had killed a
third for sustenance. Although the court seemed to consider that the actions of the
defendants were understandable, and even hinted that the Queen should commute the
sentence-which she did-the court found itself bound by an immutable standard of
morality: "We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and
to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy." Id. at 288.
50 The Supreme Court has occasionally used the "cruel and unusual punishment"
clause of the eighth amendment to strike down punishment that it finds is dispropor-
tionate to the crime. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)(life sentence for
writing a bad check is too much); but see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (forty years
for possession and sale of nine ounces of marijuana is not too much).
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sure that the jaywalker does not commit his crime again. Propor-
tionality is the moral sense that extreme penalties for many crimes
punish the offender too much for our sense ofjustice. Still, we can
accept proportionality as a limiting factor on other rationales with-
out accepting social retribution as a primary rationale for criminal
punishment.
Moreover, social retribution as narrowly defined here does not
include the rationale expressed by H.L.A. Hart in opposing Ben-
tham's "excuses" from punishment in cases in which deterrence has
no effect.51 Hart argued that "infliction of punishment on those
persons may secure a higher measure of conformity to law on the
part of normal persons than is secured by the admission of excusing
conditions," and that any increase in the number of excuses in-
creases the opportunity to deceive courts, or at least may appear to
potential criminals to increase this opportunity. 52 This argument,
while criticizing Bentham, is actually a deterrence argument, not a
social retribution one.
Indeed, many arguments commonly thought of as socially re-
tributive are actually deterrence arguments. Consider the state-
ment, "We need to maintain the moral fibre of society" by
punishing a crime. Although couched in "moral" terms, it might in
fact be an argument about deterrence. Similarly, Henry Hart's ra-
tionale for punishment-to stigmatize criminals as "immoral"-is
another variation on how to discourage criminal behavior, not an
argument for pure socially retributive punishment.
53
In sum, the argument for social retribution boils down to the
contention that criminals deserve punishment because they deserve
punishment. This statement is even narrower than the statement
that an act may be considered criminal because we decide to make it
criminal, or, to summarize Lord Devlin, an act may become a crime
because it is immoral and nothing else. 54 Even if we accept Lord
Devlin's circularity we still could choose to label an act as immoral
but not punish it.
Having narrowed the rationale of social retribution sufficiently,
one can use a utilitarian, individual-oriented, economic approach to
show that the rationale of pure social retribution cannot stand. An
economic view of a governmental action such as criminal punish-
51 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 18-20 (1968); see also J. BEN-
THAM, supra note 38, at 23-26.
52 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 51, at 19-20.
53 See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 in LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958).
54 P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1-25 (1965).
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ment analyzes the action's effects on the individuals in society, not on
some amorphous allegation of "social good" outside the utility
functions of individuals.5 5 From an individual-oriented, economic
viewpoint, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation can each be
justified because the common purpose behind each rationale-cut-
ting the amount of crime in the future-leads to the improvement of
individual utility for future, albeit unknown, potential victims of
crime.
The following hypothetical illustrates problems with the use of
the social retribution rationale for criminal punishment, as well as
the use of only the three utilitarian rationales. Consider a class of
easily identifiable and psychopathic (but not insane) individuals
upon whom we are certain criminal deterrence has no effect. Fur-
thermore, assume that this type of individual will commit exactly
one crime in his lifetime and then will cease criminal activity. Under
the utilitarian theories of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilita-
tion there is no justification for punishing one of these individuals
after he or she has committed the crime. The punishment, as as-
sumed, will have no effect whatever on any future crimes by either
this individual or any other person in the society.
The social retributionist must maintain, of course, that we must
punish this individual because he or she must "pay" for the crime,
and that social retribution alone justifies the punishment.56 How-
ever, the utilitarian responds that this is both irrational and a Pareto
inferior action. By punishing a person solely for social retribution,
government is making one person worse off-the offender suffers in
prison-while no one is made better off. It would be Pareto supe-
rior, the utilitarian argues, to allow the offender to go free, but per-
haps with a stern notice that he or she has committed a crime, so as
to notify others. The offender prefers this approach, the utilitarian
concludes, while no other individual can seriously maintain that his
interests have or will be harmed.
At this point, however, no one should be satisfied with the
seemingly logical argument of the utilitarian. If a major crime, such
as murder was involved, every law-abiding citizen would be up in
arms, demanding punishment of the offender. Does this behavior
55 Some economists use this argument to criticize governmental actions, such as the
support of the arts and Amtrak, that are alleged to be in "the public good," while not
giving much benefit to many persons. See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE
68, 201-02 (1980).
56 Advocates of a "natural law" of retribution may argue that this law has no limits.
Immanuel Kant, for one, stated that even if all members of a civilization dispersed, leav-
ing one condemned murderer to inhabit the old nation, that person still deserved to die.
I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).
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mean that nearly all members of society either act irrationally or re-
ject utilitarianism in favor of amorphous notions of social retribu-
tion? On the contrary, members of society, by demanding
punishment, express their own, individual desires to impose punish-
ment. This desire is, for lack of a less perjorative term, the individ-
ual vengeance rationale for criminal punishment.
Individual vengeance is distinguished from social retribution in
both abstract and concrete ways. First, on the economic level, indi-
vidual vengeance can easily be incorporated into a utilitarian model
of human behavior. Members of society gain satisfaction, or gain
"pleasure," from seeing or knowing that a criminal offender re-
ceives punishment. Far from being a vulgar or undesirable human
emotion, this satisfaction is an understandable and inescapable facet
of human behavior. Every child who has either experienced har-
rassment or witnessed the abuse of a friend by a bully manifests this
satisfaction when the bully gets his or her comeuppance. This same
emotion, at different levels, exists in nearly every individual.
Consider the intensity of emotions of individuals in a society
when a murderer is brought to trial.57 Would there be such intense
interest in seeing the criminal punished if what individuals were de-
manding was not an individual emotion but rather only their single
share of some philosophical rationale of social retribution? Just as
some individuals may wish to ameliorate the lives of those in pov-
erty, not because of a notion of "social justice," but because of the
satisfaction of helping the poor,58 individuals may gain satisfaction
in knowing that criminals receive punishment.
The notion that individual vengeance holds a negative connota-
tion might explain why social retribution and not aggregated indi-
vidual vengeance is commonly offered as a justification for criminal
punishment. Whereas individual vengeance smacks of lawlessness
and vigilantism, social retribution rings with social order and justice.
This was especially true in an era where it was government's goal to
rein in anarchy and offer the benefits of enlightened rule. 59 Today,
there is no reason why a civilized government may not rationally
57 Consider also the remarkable demonstration of emotion at the site of the execu-
tion in Florida of mass murderer Ted Bundy in January of 1989. Two thousand peo-
ple-most of whom had no personal connection with Bundy's victims-congregated to
cheer Bundy's death, while the execution became briefly the most anticipated event in
the nation. Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1989, at A1, col. 2 (T-shirts read "Burn Bundy"
and "Toast Ted"). This episode was an example of the aggregated desire for individual
vengeance raised to a repulsively high level.
58 See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 139-40.
59 See generally T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (reprint of 1651 ed.)(arguing in favor of gov-
ernmental "leviathan" to control horrible effects of human interaction).
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justify criminal punishment partly on the aggregated desire of indi-
viduals in the society to see that a person who has broken its laws
receives punishment.
Squeamishness about verbalizing the individual vengeance ra-
tionale may be a relatively new phenomenon. Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen wrote in 1883 that no one in England regarded violent
crimes such as murder, rape and theft "with any feeling but detesta-
tion," adding that "the infliction of punishment by law gives definite
expression and a solemn ratification and justification to the hatred
which is excited by the commission of the offence."' 60 Although one
can view Stephen's comments as advocating social retribution,
61
they actually come closer to supporting this Article's rationale of ag-
gregated individual vengeance.
Characterizing this justification for criminal punishment as ag-
gregated individual vengeance rather than social retribution creates
numerous intellectual and practical benefits. First, vengeance fits
into the utilitarian, economic, and individual model of human and
governmental behavior, while social retribution does not. Second,
individual vengeance more accurately targets human emotions.
Consider the conundrum of deciding punishment for two offend-
ers-one who maliciously stabs a victim without causing permanent
harm, and another who has defrauded a family out of half of their
life's savings. Under a social retribution rationale, the second crimi-
nal might be at least as socially irresponsible and might have caused
more lasting harm. Yet, why would many individuals believe that
the first criminal should receive more- punishment than the sec-
ond?6 2 Perhaps violent crimes stir more vigorously than financial
crimes the natural emotions in persons not parties to the crimes. To
return to the schoolyard example, both a bystander and a child
knocked down in the mud by a bully burn more passionately for
revenge than they might if the bully had "merely" extorted lunch
money from the child.
Finally, of course, a rationale for criminal punishment based on
aggregated individual desire for vengeance can incorporate what
Justice Scalia in Booth called the "outpouring of popular concern for
what has come to be known as 'victims' rights.' "63 This is not a call
60 j. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883).
61 See P. Low,.J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 44, at 2-3.
62 Social radicals may attempt to chastise social values in this circumstance by argu-
ing that "middle class" values are threatened more by violence than by white-collar
crime, and that extreme reactions to violent crime represent an attempt by the affluent
to suppress the stirrings of the underprivileged. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 47, at 23-24
& n.* (statistics provide evidence of a pro-white-collar bias).
63 Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2542 (1987)(Scalia,J. dissenting).
1989] 189
PAUL BOUDREAUX
for vigilantism or for allowing persons as emotionally involved as
victims to dictate the punishment of offenders. Rather, the notion
of "victim's vengeance" states that if vengeance of individuals is a
valid rationale for punishment, courts and juries should promi-
nently consider the feelings and desires of those who are the actual
victims of the crime. To put it in economic terms, acknowledge-
ment of the satisfaction or utility gained by individuals in society
upon seeing that a criminal has received punishment compels the
recognition that the greatest satisfaction, desire, and utility comes to
the actual victim or the victim's family. In sum, if one accepts ven-
geance of individuals as a valid consideration, one should consider
the desires of victims foremost.
The implications and problems of this theory of vengeance are
addressed in Part IV. The theories in this Article, in stoking the
fires of the debate, do not advocate an increase in the overall levels
of punishment. Instead, it suggests a change in the calculus used to
determine relative levels of punishment.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
If one accepts, as did the majority in Booth, that blameworthi-
ness of the defendant is the sole criterion with which to determine
the severity of criminal punishment, then the majority is clearly cor-
rect in holding the level of harm caused to the victim's family-a
factor extrinsic to blameworthiness-is irrelevant. This Article
shows, however, that an analysis of the underlying justifications for
criminal punishment might change such an assumption. The desire
for vengeance by individuals, not social retribution, mustjoin deter-
rence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. With this definition of ag-
gregated individual vengeance as a justification for punishment, we
must consider more closely Justice Scalia's exhortation that the sen-
tencing jury may consider the extent of a murder's effects on the
victim's family. Of course, acceptance of individual vengeance as a
rationale for punishment allows for rejection of the use of testimony
by the victim's family in deciding the severity of punishment. Never-
theless, Justice Scalia's argument carries added intellectual weight.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOOTH
The term "victims' rights," Justice Scalia explained in his dis-
sent in Booth, "describes what its proponents feel is the failure of
courts of justice to take into account in their sentencing decisions
• ..the amount of harm [the defendant] has caused to innocent
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members of society." 64 In a moderate form, such a consideration
could take the form of allowing a range of sentences for a particular
crime. 65 The judge or jury would determine the choice of punish-
ment within that range based on both mitigating factors presented
by the defendant and by evidence of the extent of the harm caused
to the victim or the victim's family. This strays from the notion of
blameworthiness as the only factor considered in fixing punish-
ment.6 6 However, if one accepts the notion of aggregated individ-
ual vengeance as a rationale for criminal punishment, one can more
forcefully argue that the level of punishment, within bounds, should
vary according to the level of vengeful desire felt among individual
members of the society. Furthermore, if this vengeful desire re-
ceives consideration and weight, certainly the emotions of the actual
victims or their families should receive foremost consideration.
This Article seeks only to stir a debate over the individual ven-
geance rationale for criminal punishment. Consequently, it does
not address all of the ethical and moral questions raised by the ra-
tionale. However, one major problem that must be addressed is the
fact that allowing consideration of a victim's vengeance might cause
sentences to vary according to factors completely irrelevant to the
defendant. This would be equivalent to the tort doctrine that the
offender "takes his victim as he finds him"; if a tort victim has a high
income or an articulate, loving family, the offender might pay more.
In the criminal law context, this might mean a lesser punishment for
the murder of a vagrant with no friends or family than for the mur-
der of a person with an articulate, loving family. Such wide varia-
tions in criminal punishment for the same crime and
blameworthiness might be ameliorated in a number of ways. For
example, variations could be limited to a narrow range of punish-
ments for each crime, 6 7 so as to ensure that the murderer of a va-
grant is not treated less harshly than the person who commits a
nonfatal assault and battery of a person with a loving family. In-
64 Id.
65 The current federal sentencing guidelines mathematically calculate a range of
punishment in which the judge may choose a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986). The amount of harm
caused to a victim's family, for example, could be added to the factors that mathemati-
cally determine the range of possible sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (list of factors
that are considered).
66 See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text for discussion of the majority's argu-
ment in Booth.
67 The federal sentencing guidelines already provide for a mathematical calculation
of a range of possible sentences. See supra note 65.
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deed, any scheme that provided otherwise would seriously misjudge
the levels of resentment felt in individuals not parties to the crime.
Finally, the punishment of murderers might just require a dose
of tort doctrine. In tort law, we allow the level of damages to vary
according to factors completely outside of the defendant's control
because of our desire to accurately compensate victims for the inju-
ries. 68 Analogously, to compensate accurately for the anguish and
loss suffered by a murder victim's family, we might permit juries to
consider varying the severity of punishment. In economic terms,
juries may award a more severe sentence when it will create a signifi-
cant increase in satisfaction for the victim's loving family. Likewise,
when a person without a family is murdered, no family member is
available to gain satisfaction from seeing the murderer punished.
This argument may at first seem callous or insensitive when a
defendant's life is at stake, as in Booth. However, evidence of impact
on the victim's family would constitute at most only one of a number
of factors considered by a sentencing jury. As Justice Scalia wrote:
To require, as we have, that all mitigating factors which render capital
punishment a harsh penalty in the particular case be placed before the
sentencing authority, while simultaneously requiring, as we do today,
that evidence of much of the human suffering the defendant has in-
flicted be suppressed, is in effect to prescribe a debate on the appro-
priateness of the capital penalty with one side muted.
69
Justice Scalia did not mention that mitigating evidence relates to the
blameworthiness of the defendant, whereas evidence of impact on
the victim's family does not. Still, Justice Scalia is correct in noting
that testimony from the victm's family would rarely be the only
"emotional" evidence in the sentencing phase of a death penalty
trial.
The majority in Booth objected to evidence from a victim's fam-
ily for two reasons. First, the majority was concerned that such evi-
dence would be inherently arbitrary; the impact of the family's
evidence would vary greatly from case to case, depending on the
articulateness and willingness of the family to testify. Second, the
majority was disturbed that the defense would face the difficult and
unpleasant task of trying to rebut the family's evidence.70 In re-
sponse, tort juries and defense attorneys successfully manage with
such problems all the time, as do murder sentencing juries when
presented with mitigating evidence about the defendant's character.
68 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
69 Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2542 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
70 Id. at 2534-35.
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B. THE SCOPE OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
What form should evidence of impact on victims take if deemed
admissible? The mandatory Maryland Victim Impact Statement
(VIS) was rather open-ended. 71 The statement admitted in Booth in-
cluded detailed testimony of the anguish and suffering felt by the
victims' family as well as the family's opinions of the nature of the
crime and the probability of the defendant's rehabilitation. 72 Under
a rationale that accepts family testimony because it recognizes the
family's satisfaction from seeing punishment imposed, evidence of
the family's anguish and suffering, as well as whether the family
members desire a severe sentence, should be admissible. There is
no justification, however, for admitting statements of the family's
characterizations of the factual events of the crime.73 The jury must
learn facts from direct evidence, not from the potentially skewed im-
pressions of persons who do not necessarily have first-hand knowl-
edge of the facts. 74 Similarly, the lay opinions of family members
about the defendant's chances for rehabilitation are worthless. In
sum, if evidence of the impact of a murder on a victim's family mem-
bers is admitted under a vengeance rationale, the evidence should
be tailored and limited more so than the VIS in Booth. A proper VIS
would eliminate prejudicial and irrelevant characterizations of fact
that do not help the jury determine the extent of suffering by family
members.
Furthermore, a fair and constitutional use of victim impact
statements would include safeguards to ensure that such evidence
does not become the focus of the trial. First, family evidence should
not be admitted until a jury has found a murder defendant guilty
and until the level of punishment is fixed within certain bounds.
Second, the judge should admonish the sentencing jury to consider
all evidence, including any mitigating evidence as well as evidence
from the victim's family. Third, evidence of the family's financial
losses should be excluded because such claims are the province of
tort, not criminal law. Finally, lawmakers should closely question
the usefulness of victim impact evidence with regard to crimes less
serious than murder. In cases involving less serious crimes the indi-
vidual vengeance arguments are weaker; still, the Booth Court did
71 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
73 The VIS in Booth included a statement by the victim's son that the victims were
"butchered like animals." 107 S. Ct. at 2531. No doubt they were, but that was a ques-
tion for the jury to decide on the evidence.
74 See generally FED. R. EvID. 602 (personal knowledge required).
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not rule as unconstitutional the use of the VIS in other than capital
murder cases.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR CRIMINALIZATION
Part III of this Article set forth the theory that aggregated indi-
vidual vengeance, not social retribution, is a valid rationale for crim-
inal punishment. Although this proposal may have untoward
consequences for some murder defendants, it does not necessarily
justify a general increase in the levels of criminal punishment. In-
deed, in the area of criminalization it argues for decriminalization of
some acts.
An accepted premise of law in some quarters is that "morality"
may be enforced by criminalization, even if there is no other justifi-
cation for criminalization. 75 The Supreme Court has ruled the
criminalization of "immorality" constitutional even when it involves
intrusion into private acts of consenting individuals. 76
A moral obligation to punish, based on social retributive
grounds, buttresses the arguments for the criminalization of im-
moral acts. Such arguments do not fit, however, in a regime that
punishes only when the punishment prevents future violations of in-
dividuals' interests (the rationales of deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation) or gives direct satisfaction to individuals (individual
vengeance). It is considerably more difficult for the government to
justify criminalization of actions such as homosexual activities if it is
forced to throw aside the cloak of social "morality" and identify spe-
cific groups of individuals who actually benefit from the criminaliza-
tion of such acts. This argument against criminalization simply to
enforce notions of pure "morality" is not new. It essentially restates
John Stuart Mill's view that punishment is justified only when harm
to another is shown. 7 7 Among modern commentators, H.L.A. Hart
has advanced similar theories. 78 What is new is that if individual
vengeance replaces social retribution as a rationale for punishment,
the stance of the libertarians and economists is enhanced at the ex-
pense of moralists and retributionists.
79
75 See P. DEVLIN, supra note 54.
76 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(no privacy right to commit ho-
mosexual sodomy).
77 Mill stated that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9
(E. Rapaport rev. ed. 1978).
78 See, e.g., Hart, Immorality and Treason, in 62 LISTENER 162 (1959).
79 For example, economic libertarians Milton and Rose Friedman are critical of
criminalizing drug use on purely moral grounds because they argue that more persons
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Consider the example of criminalization of homosexual acts. A
moralist might contend that, because of some notion of perceived
morality, we are entitled to punish homosexuals under the socially
retributive rationale.80 If a homosexual violates the supposed social
fabric of morality, "society" is entitled to make him "pay" for his
violation. Alternatively, if we require criminal punishment to be
tied to some economic, individual utility-enhancing rationale, both
the social fabric and retributive arguments crumble. Here, govem-
ment must specify which individuals or group(s) of individuals are
potentially benefitted by the criminalization. If government cannot
specify potential beneficiaries, criminalization of the acts is a Pareto
inferior move and cannot be justified.
Defenders of criminalization of homosexual acts might then re-
treat to the rationale that criminalization is justified because they
and others in society gain satisfaction from knowing that those they
find immoral are being punished. It is important to note, however,
that this argument would be a significant step away from the old
"social morality" argument. Moralists could not seriously argue
that individuals gain utility from knowing that unknown homosexu-
als receive punishment in the same sense that a victim of a crime or
the family of a murder victim gains utility from seeing the punish-
ment of persons who have directly violated their individual auton-
omy, interests, or rights. Essentially the moralists' argument boils
down to "it should be illegal because we want it to be illegal" and
nothing else. This should not be considered a tenable stand in
modem legal debate.
In sum, replacing the rationale of social retribution for criminal
punishment with one of aggregated individual vengeance is not a
call for greater punishment. Rather, it works hand in hand with the
libertarian position on criminalization, which argues that acts should
be criminalized only when individual members of society definitely
benefit from criminalization.8 1
V. CONCLUSION
Arguments for criminal punishment based on social retribution,
would be better off if certain drugs were legalized. M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, TYR-
ANNY OF THE STATUS Quo 137-41 (1984).
80 See, e.g., Note, Behind the Facade: Understanding the Potential Extension of the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy to Homosexual Conduct, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1233, 1233, 1244-50
(1986) (applauding Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), both on constitutional and
moral grounds, based on "society's disdain for homosexuality"); 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 215 (homosexuality is a "crime against
nature").
81 See supra note 79.
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general blameworthiness, and moral guilt are appealing in part be-
cause they seem innate and irrefutable. This Article contends,
however, that when one approaches the issue of criminal punish-
ment from an individual-oriented, utilitarian stance, the time-
honored rationale of social retribution has little substance. Rather,
the innate disgust for criminals felt by individuals is better charac-
terized as a desire for individual vengeance which, when aggregated
among individuals, provides a separate rationale for criminal pun-
ishment. Unlike social retribution, however, aggregated individual
vengeance both fits into an economic model of punishment and
more clearly reflects common human emotions.
Once we accept as a rationale for punishment the satisfaction
gained by individuals from knowing that violent criminals receive
punishment, we can consider more clearly the case for what Justice
Scalia in Booth called "victims' rights."' 82 In a murder case, the vic-
tim's family may suffer terribly, and their intense, personal desires
to see harsh punishment imposed on the murderer reflects their
anguish. We should not allow the family to dictate terms, but it may
be desirable to allow sentencing juries, within boundaries, to con-
sider the anguish of the family and the satisfaction and sense ofjus-
tice they would receive from a stiff sentence. Such a policy is not
necessarily completely desirable. However, the individual ven-
geance rationale for punishment may immeasurably advance the
cause of "victims' rights."
82 Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2542 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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